Security alertsMon, 16 Nov 2026
Microsoft begins removing eMudhra root trust: replace dependent certificates and test each runtime
Microsoft scheduled removal of the remaining ten eMudhra roots from its Trusted Root Program starting 16 November. Delivery varies by product. Replace dependent chains and verify browsers, applications and signing workflows from the environments that use them.
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Microsoft’s 12 November 2026 update schedules the removal of the remaining ten eMudhra root certificates from the Microsoft Trusted Root Program starting on 16 November. Once the applicable change reaches a device or service, chains that depend on a removed root may stop validating unless the client can build another trusted path. Delivery varies across devices, images and runtimes.
In October, researchers and root programs confirmed that eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys could be recovered because of a key-generation flaw. Six were associated with TLS and two with code signing. eMudhra revoked the affected intermediates, and Microsoft separately applied protections against the compromised key material and removed certificates from its default trust lists. The ten-root program change is a further trust decision. It does not establish that those root private keys were compromised or that businesses whose certificates fail validation have been breached.
- 01
Identify the existing chain and trust store
A service or signed artifact may rely on an eMudhra chain. Clients may validate it against different trust stores.
- 02
Understand the October security risk
If someone used a recoverable intermediate key and a client still trusted the relevant chain, the key could enable unauthorized TLS certificates or code signatures.
- 03
Check the November change
When a client receives the applicable trust update, default validation can fail if an affected root is required.
- 04
Verify the actual outcome
Check accepted chains and unexpected signatures separately from availability failures such as blocked TLS connections or package validation.
Product rollout dates and delivery channels
This schedule reflects the 12 November MSRC update. Where Microsoft describes a release or image refresh as planned or dependent on an upstream change, verify the status for the exact device or image you use.
| Product or service | Microsoft’s published schedule and scope |
|---|---|
| Microsoft Trusted Root Program / Windows | 16 November. The program removes ten roots. Windows receives the updated trusted root list through automatic certificate trust distribution where devices, including Azure Windows VMs, can reach the update endpoint. |
| Microsoft Edge / WebView2 | 16 November, via the PKI Metadata component. MSRC names four roots for this delivery: emSign Root CA - G1, emSign Root CA - C1, emSign ECC Root CA and emSign Root TLS CA - G1. Edge and WebView2 check for PKI Metadata updates about every ten hours and shortly after launch. |
| Azure Linux | Scheduled for 16 November. The team plans to remove the roots and refresh VM and container images. |
| Azure API Management self-hosted gateway | Timing depends on the updated Alpine .NET image following Mozilla’s 16 November release. Microsoft plans to publish a new gateway image after the base image is available. |
| .NET container images and SDK | Container image updates follow upstream certificate packages, starting with Azure Linux on 16 November. Microsoft plans a .NET SDK trust-bundle update in December. NuGet.org already blocks the affected certificates on package upload. |
| Microsoft Build of OpenJDK | Follows the Mozilla root store update through Microsoft’s regular monthly Critical Patch Update cycle. Microsoft says the October release blocked the eMudhra G1 certificate. |
| Azure CLI | 2.92.0, released 3 November, blocks emSign ECC Root CA - G3. Version 2.93.0, scheduled for 16 November, removes emSign Root CA - C1 and emSign ECC Root CA - C3 from the bundled trust store. |
| npm registry, website and CLI | Microsoft plans no npm-specific release for this removal. The registry and website already run a Node.js release with October protections. The CLI uses Node.js trust data, and removal of the remaining G1 root depends on Node.js. |
| Visual Studio Marketplace and VS Code | Marketplace signature validation uses the Windows root store. MSRC listed a separate node-vsce-sign fix for 12 November and VS Code 1.147.0 for 18 November. |
The October Windows update for six G3 roots and an AAA Certificate Services cross-sign was separately made available to disconnected devices and is included in the 10 November security update. Use the current Microsoft guidance when verifying trust data on disconnected devices.
- 01
Find certificates and the runtimes that validate them
Map the chains in use on internet-facing and internal sites, gateways, load balancers, outsourced services, signing workflows, APIs, and mutual TLS where deployed. Include serverless workloads, containers and pinned CI runner images. Record whether each consumer relies on Windows, Edge/WebView2, a Linux package or a runtime-bundled trust store.
See what to doResources: 2
TWISA member solutions
Find certificates and the runtimes that validate them
Use asset discovery and PKI inventory to find affected chains and the clients that depend on them. Group them by application and trust store owner.
- 02
Replace dependent certificates and update trust stores
Obtain replacement certificates or an alternative supported chain that excludes the affected signing keys and anchors. Update the actual runtimes and base images, redeploy workloads, and coordinate distribution to Windows systems that cannot receive automatic trust-list updates. Keep certificate and signature validation enabled.
See what to doResources: 2
TWISA member solutions
Replace dependent certificates and update trust stores
Use certificate lifecycle and application security services to stage renewal, update trust bundles and verify the new chain in each consuming runtime.
- 03
Check the applicable Microsoft update path
Confirm that Windows trust-list updates, Edge component updates and managed runtime or image updates reach the environments you own. Follow release-specific guidance for any component still waiting on an upstream release.
View guidanceResources: 2
Response guidance
Check the applicable Microsoft update path
Confirm that Windows trust-list updates, Edge component updates and managed runtime or image updates reach the environments you own. Follow release-specific guidance for any component still waiting on an upstream release.
- 04
Retest production paths and investigate anomalies
Test the replacement chain with the clients that use it. Verify browser and WebView2 access, API calls, signing and package validation, mutual TLS where applicable and disaster recovery. Review TLS and signature errors against the rollout timeline. If you find suspicious certificate issuance, unexpected signatures or other signs of compromise, preserve logs and escalate through incident response.
See what to doResources: 2
TWISA member solutions
Retest production paths and investigate anomalies
Use monitoring to group trust errors by runtime, chain and deployment. Incident responders can investigate unexpected signatures or suspected interception with the available evidence.
Record service endpoints, certificate chains, signing keys, trust stores and the rollout state of connected and disconnected clients.
Allow authorized traffic and apply controls at each layer.
- 01
Certificates presented at the edge
Websites, APIs, gateways and managed endpoints
Replace dependent chainsVerify the new chain at the actual termination point.
- 02
Client and runtime trust
Windows, Edge/WebView2, Linux, containers and bundled trust stores
Update and verifyConfirm the effective trust store and reinstall or redeploy images where needed.
- 03
Business and signing workflows
Internal APIs, mutual TLS, CI/CD and signed packages
Test end to endVerify trusted replacement paths in real consuming applications.
Feed logs and traffic data from each layer into monitoring and response.
- Monitor and investigateCorrelate certificate or signature failures with product and trust rollout status. Preserve evidence if you observe unexpected issuance or signatures.
- Validate recoveryRetest with the replacement chains and current trust stores. Restore failed services through trusted certificates or configurations.
Check PyPI publishing workflows
PyPA's 21 October 2026 advisory rates pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish at 9.3 (CVSS v4.0). The action bundled emSign roots through certifi, whose TLS trust store Sigstore uses for Trusted Publishing and Digital Attestations. The advisory's version table marks releases through 1.14.2 as affected and lists 1.14.3 and later as patched. Its prose describes releases before 1.14.2 as bundling the roots. Use the published patched floor of 1.14.3 when updating workflow tags or commit pins.
Verify the action version resolved by each runner, then use a controlled publishing workflow to retest Trusted Publishing and attestation creation and verification.
Proactive testing and retesting
With authorization, discover endpoints and scan their presented chains. Exercise TLS, API, mutual TLS and package checks from representative clients. Use controlled negative tests to verify that clients reject untrusted chains and signatures. Verify any separate WAF-protected HTTP flows against their request, alert, actual blocking and backend outcomes. Test host privilege and internal access separately.
TWISA member solutions
Supporting: Find certificates and the runtimes that validate them
Use asset discovery and PKI inventory to find affected chains and the clients that depend on them. Group them by application and trust store owner.
Supporting: Replace dependent certificates and update trust stores
Use certificate lifecycle and application security services to stage renewal, update trust bundles and verify the new chain in each consuming runtime.
Supporting: Retest production paths and investigate anomalies
Use monitoring to group trust errors by runtime, chain and deployment. Incident responders can investigate unexpected signatures or suspected interception with the available evidence.
Related TWISA advisories
- Python certificate trust: update tooling in every runtime
- eMudhra intermediate CA key risk and Java trust updates (Traditional Chinese)
Primary sources
- MSRC product rollout schedule and safeguards
- Microsoft Trusted Root Program notice and certificate list
- Edge Stable Channel announcements
- Azure Linux project notice
- Mozilla’s investigation of the recoverable intermediate keys
- eMudhra statement on the certificate security incident
For further product and service details, please contact the relevant TWISA members.
Advisory updated: 2026/11/16. Check the vendor’s latest information for product support and fixes.