Taiwan Information Security Association

Security alertsSat, 14 Nov 2026

ScreenConnect SCKit activity: disable identified extensions and verify technician clients

Blackpoint observed unauthorized ScreenConnect client deployments. The SCKit toolkit attempted to spread back to technician workstations, with no confirmed success in this investigation. Disable the extensions identified by ConnectWise, verify technician client version 26.6.5 or later, and investigate with separate tooling.

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Article

Managed service providers and internal IT teams should check the remote support path from the management console to technician workstations and customer devices. Blackpoint observed unauthorized ScreenConnect deployments through legitimate cloud-hosted consoles on 11 November 2026. On 13 November it reported further unauthorized installations in activity it says appears to target on-premises instances.

Blackpoint found that SCKit attempts to turn a support session into a path from a compromised endpoint back to the technician’s workstation. Its test against an updated technician client showed no successful reverse execution, and its investigation did not confirm successful reverse propagation. ConnectWise’s 13 November update says its investigation is ongoing. How attackers initially entered partner environments remains unknown.

Attack flowFrom confirmed rogue deployments to attempted reverse spread
  1. 01

    Get access to a partner console

    Initial access remains under investigation. Third-party extension abuse is one possibility.

  2. 02

    Deploy unauthorized clients

    Attackers used legitimate management functions to install rogue Access clients and stage SCKit on managed endpoints.

  3. 03

    Attempt endpoint-to-technician execution

    When a technician connects, RelayTrap attempts Guest-to-Host file execution through the client flaw.

  4. 04

    Attempt to expand from the technician

    If the prior step succeeds, later code attempts to recover a browser session and use existing permissions to send commands to other endpoints.

Two vulnerabilities at different points in the attack path

VulnerabilityAffected software and required conditionsAction
CVE-2026-127063ConnectWise CNA, CVSS v4.0 9.3, published 12 November 2026. DataComm’s third-party RMM+ extension, all versions in the CNA record. An installation that retains the default static API secret can expose command capabilities through the extension API.Follow the Trust Center’s extension disablement instructions.
CVE-2026-84869ConnectWise CNA, CVSS v3.1 9.9, published 8 September 2026. ScreenConnect clients earlier than 26.6.5. Under certain conditions, an active remote session allows file transfer and execution without the technician’s approval.Update technician clients to 26.6.5 or later and verify the installed version on each workstation.

ConnectWise also cites researchers’ report that RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 could accept an empty access key if none had been configured. The extension finding and the client vulnerability describe different mechanisms. CISA added the client CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog in September 2026. Blackpoint’s November investigation did not establish that attackers used either CVE for initial access or that this campaign successfully exploited the client flaw.

Extensions named in the 13 November Trust Center update

ConnectWise directs on-premises partners to disable Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. It also disabled ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter in its cloud environments and marketplace as a precaution, and strongly recommends that partners keep these three disabled across deployment types until further notice.

Response flowRecommended actions: from the perimeter to core systems
  1. 01

    Disable identified extensions and verify every technician client

    Follow the current Trust Center instructions for every partner console. On-premises partners must disable the five listed extension variants. Verify that every technician workstation, including those supporting cloud-hosted consoles, runs client 26.6.5 or later. Update endpoint access agents as well. While deploying the fix, remove unneeded Transfer Files permissions by role and session group.

    View guidanceResources: 2

    Response guidance

    Disable identified extensions and verify every technician client

    Follow the current Trust Center instructions for every partner console. On-premises partners must disable the five listed extension variants. Verify that every technician workstation, including those supporting cloud-hosted consoles, runs client 26.6.5 or later. Update endpoint access agents as well. While deploying the fix, remove unneeded Transfer Files permissions by role and session group.

  2. 02

    Map console, technician and customer exposure

    Inventory on-premises and cloud consoles, extensions, technician clients, Access agents and who can reach each tenant. Coordinate scope and containment with managed customers and service providers.

    See what to doResources: 1

    TWISA member solutions

    Map console, technician and customer exposure

    Use asset discovery and endpoint inventory to compare deployed versions, expected remote access tools and approved relay destinations across tenants.

  3. 03

    Revoke sessions from a trusted device

    Revoke active ScreenConnect and associated identity-provider sessions. Reset relevant credentials, enforce MFA, and review administrator and API permissions. Verify session invalidation separately from the password reset.

    See what to doResources: 1

    TWISA member solutions

    Revoke sessions from a trusted device

    Use identity and privileged access controls to narrow technician permissions and invalidate sessions from a trusted administration path.

  4. 04

    Investigate with independent tooling

    Use EDR or another trusted out-of-band method on suspected customer endpoints and technician workstations. Preserve authentication, extension API, Run Command, permission changes and Toolbox records. Check unexpected remote access installations, new services and scheduled tasks, and correlate endpoints with support session activity.

    See what to doResources: 3

    TWISA member solutions

    Investigate with independent tooling

    Correlate deployment and identity records with independent endpoint telemetry. Use an incident response channel you control to investigate devices that may contain a rogue remote access client.

  5. 05

    Remove remaining access and verify recovery

    Isolate affected devices as appropriate. After preserving evidence, clear unauthorized queued tools and commands, remove rogue clients and persistence, and review other endpoints reachable through any affected account. Restore remote administration and reconnect devices only after validating the environment.

    See what to doResources: 2

    TWISA member solutions

    Remove remaining access and verify recovery

    Incident responders can verify cleanup and re-establish approved administration paths. Monitor for clients that reappear, unexpected commands and unusual relay traffic.

Response flowAuthorized verification and retesting
  1. 01

    Discover and check assets

    Find remote administration endpoints, consoles, installed versions and extensions. Verify inventory and version checks for technician workstations.

  2. 02

    Test permissions safely

    Use authorized penetration and API testing and controlled attack simulation to validate extension access, file transfer permissions and tenant separation.

  3. 03

    Verify console web protection separately

    If a WAF protects a console HTTP route, check the request, alert, actual block and backend result. Separately verify the client session and endpoint execution boundaries.

  4. 04

    Retest after containment and updates

    Confirm extension disablement, client versions, session revocation and legitimate support functions with approved systems.

Defense architectureSeparate console access, technician sessions and managed customer endpoints

Map support consoles, extensions, technician workstations, Access agents and customer tenants.

Allow authorized traffic and apply controls at each layer.

  1. 01

    Management console

    Cloud or on-premises administration and extension APIs

    Limit accessKeep named extensions disabled, enforce MFA and restrict administration.

  2. 02

    Technician workstation

    ScreenConnect Host client and identity session

    Patch and verifyRun 26.6.5 or later and confirm session revocation when needed.

  3. 03

    Customer endpoint

    Approved Access agents and managed services

    Contain and validateInvestigate using independent tooling and allow only approved clients.

Feed logs and traffic data from each layer into monitoring and response.

  1. Correlate activity across tenantsReview extension API calls, Run Command history, authentication and endpoint events together.
  2. Investigate outside the support channelPreserve evidence, remove unauthorized clients or persistence, and verify clean reconnection.

TWISA member solutions

Primary sources and investigation indicators

For further product and service details, please contact the relevant TWISA members.

Advisory updated: 2026/11/14. Check the vendor’s latest information for product support and fixes.