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Security alertsSun, 15 Nov 2026

SAP November security updates: four critical flaws in network and authentication components

SAP rates four November vulnerabilities at CVSS v3.1 10.0. Check Web Dispatcher, NetWeaver ICM, SAP Gateway and ABAP SAML2 deployments against their individual Security Notes.

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Article

SAP published these four vulnerabilities on 10 November 2026. Each has a vendor and CNA CVSS v3.1 base score of 10.0. Teams operating SAP environments should map the affected components to actual network paths and apply the corresponding Security Notes.

The risks differ by component. Internet-facing Web Dispatcher and ICM services may accept traffic before an application login. An internal Gateway may be reachable through a partner network or a compromised workstation. A SAML2 service provider may expose privileged application accounts if its configuration meets the attack conditions. CISA’s ADP assessments report no known exploitation for the four CVEs.

Vulnerability and componentAccess required and potential impact
CVE-2026-76964 · SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP, Internet Communication ManagerAn unauthenticated attacker able to reach the affected functionality can send crafted network traffic that corrupts memory and could execute arbitrary code.
CVE-2026-89126 · SAP Web DispatcherAn unauthenticated attacker able to reach affected Web Dispatcher functionality can trigger memory corruption with crafted network input and could execute arbitrary code.
CVE-2026-89103 · SAP GatewayAn attacker with network access and no SAP account can exploit a permissive default ACL to be treated as an internal application server. This may allow unauthorized actions in the application environment.
CVE-2026-120017 · SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP and ABAP Platform, SAML2 Service ProviderUnder certain configurations, an unauthenticated attacker can submit crafted authentication data to bypass checks and impersonate users, including privileged accounts.
Attack flowSeparate the network input, Gateway trust and SAML assertion paths
  1. 01

    Reach an affected component

    The prerequisite is network access to the affected functionality. SAML2 additionally depends on configuration.

  2. 02

    Trigger the relevant weakness

    Crafted network traffic may corrupt ICM or Web Dispatcher memory. The Gateway path abuses the default ACL. The SAML2 path uses crafted authentication data.

  3. 03

    Gain capability within the affected system

    Possible effects are code execution, unauthorized Gateway actions or user impersonation, depending on the CVE.

  4. 04

    Assess effects on connected systems

    Review reachable interfaces, runtime permissions and account privileges to determine potential effects on business transactions and data.

Affected component versions and SAP Security Notes

The table follows the component and version groupings in SAP’s November Patch Day bulletin. Use the current Security Note to identify the applicable corrections and patch prerequisites for your specific deployment.

CVEAffected versions listed by SAPSecurity Note
CVE-2026-76964KRNL64UC 7.53. KERNEL 7.53, 7.54, 7.77, 7.93, 9.16, 9.18, 9.20.3778530
CVE-2026-89126HDB 2.00. KRNL64UC 7.53. WEBDISP 7.53, 7.54, 7.77, 7.93, 9.16. XS_ADVANCED_RUNTIME 1.00. SAP_EXTENDED_APP_SERVICES 1. KERNEL 7.53, 7.54, 7.77, 7.93, 9.16, 9.18, 9.20.3778556
CVE-2026-89103KRNL64NUC 7.22 and 7.22EXT. KRNL64UC 7.22, 7.22EXT, 7.53, 8.04. KERNEL 7.22, 7.53, 7.54, 7.77, 7.93, 8.04, 9.16, 9.20, 9.21.3798345
CVE-2026-120017SAP_BASIS 702, 731, 740, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 816, 920, 921, 922.3849308
Response flowRecommended actions: from the perimeter to core systems
  1. 01

    Map exposure by component and network path

    Inventory public and internal Web Dispatchers, NetWeaver AS ABAP instances, SAP Gateways and SAML2 service providers. Include outsourced systems, standby and disaster-recovery instances, containers and embedded component copies where used. Identify network reachability from each relevant segment.

    See what to doResources: 4

    TWISA member solutions

    Map exposure by component and network path

    Use inventory and exposure assessment to locate overlooked instances. Validate that network controls permit required peers and prevent unnecessary reachability. ShareTech’s NU-6000 can implement allowlists or separation for SAP management and internal network segments when deployed on those paths. Configure rules for approved systems and retain SAP’s updates as the fix. The TWISA member offer runs through 31 December 2026. Use code TWISA2026_ShareTech for 5% off, one year of AI IPS and AI Sandstorm protection, and a 30-month hardware warranty.

  2. 02

    Apply the individual SAP corrections

    Use the current Note for each affected component and branch. Coordinate with SAP Basis, identity and hosting teams, stage updates and verify that all production and standby nodes have received their corrections.

    View guidanceResources: 4

    Response guidance

    Apply the individual SAP corrections

    Use the current Note for each affected component and branch. Coordinate with SAP Basis, identity and hosting teams, stage updates and verify that all production and standby nodes have received their corrections.

  3. 03

    Verify trust settings and business transactions

    Check the running kernel, component and support package levels after maintenance. Review approved Gateway peers and ACL behavior. Validate SAML sign-in against authorized identity providers, then test representative workflows and integration jobs.

    See what to doResources: 2

    TWISA member solutions

    Verify trust settings and business transactions

    Use identity and application security testing to verify SAML trust and application permission boundaries after updates.

  4. 04

    Investigate unusual process, Gateway or SAML activity

    Preserve and correlate network, Web Dispatcher, ICM, Gateway, ABAP, identity provider and host logs as available. Review suspicious processes or connection patterns, unexpected Gateway actions and privileged sessions without matching identity-provider activity. If evidence indicates compromise, isolate affected systems as appropriate, trace connected services and restore from trusted artifacts.

    See what to doResources: 2

    TWISA member solutions

    Investigate unusual process, Gateway or SAML activity

    Use monitoring and incident response services to correlate evidence by component, determine the reach of affected accounts or service processes and validate recovery.

Defense architectureProtect SAP entry points, application trust and business systems

Map component versions, network and trust paths, outsourced services and failover.

Allow authorized traffic and apply controls at each layer.

  1. 01

    SAP network entry

    Web Dispatcher and reachable ICM interfaces

    Limit exposure and patchRemove unnecessary paths and apply the matching network component updates.

  2. 02

    Application and identity trust

    SAP Gateway ACLs, ABAP and SAML2 service providers

    Check trust decisionsVerify approved peers and identity providers after applying SAP corrections.

  3. 03

    Business systems and data

    Connected interfaces, transactions and databases

    Limit impactApply least privilege and validate business workflows and recoverability.

Feed logs and traffic data from each layer into monitoring and response.

  1. Correlate network, application and identity activityReview unusual peer connections, process activity and privileged sessions across SAP and connected systems.
  2. Investigate and verify recoveryPreserve evidence, contain affected paths and verify trusted configurations and business services before restoring access.

Proactive testing and retesting

Within authorized scope, discover assets, scan component versions, and use penetration or API tests and controlled attack simulation where appropriate. Test Gateway peer restrictions and SAML2 trust boundaries in a controlled environment. Where a WAF protects an applicable HTTP route, verify the request, alert, actual block and backend outcome individually. Verify host privilege boundaries and internal connectivity separately. Retest approved traffic and business transactions after changes.

TWISA member solutions

Official sources

For further product and service details, please contact the relevant TWISA members.

Advisory updated: 2026/11/15. Check the vendor’s latest information for product support and fixes.